Recent scholarship on regulatory oversight has focused on cost-benefit analysis of prescriptive regulations -regulations that restrict behavior such as pollution -and their use to cure market failures, and has overlooked the vast number of transfer regulations. Transfer regulations are regulations that channel funds to beneficiaries. These regulations are authorized by statutes that establish entitlement programs like Medicare and Social Security, pay one-time distributions to victims of misfortunes such as natural disasters and the 9/11 terrorist attack, and fund pork barrel spending. Cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer regulations because all transfer regulations fail cost-benefit analysis, but cost-effectiveness analysis can be used to evaluate transfer regulation. Although executive orders appear to require agencies to use cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer regulations that have a large economic impact, the agencies' record is dismal. Most agencies fail to perform cost-effectiveness analysis, and other agencies perform cost-effectiveness analysis incorrectly. More vigorous OMB and, possibly, judicial review could improve the quality of distributive regulations. 6
INTRODUCTION
Every year the Office of Management and Budget sends a report to Congress that discusses federal regulations reviewed by OMB during the prior year. 2 These reports include a calculation of the aggregate costs and benefits of most major or significant regulations, so that Congress and the public may be given a sense of the welfare impact of regulatory policy. But excluded from this calculation is a class of regulations that OMB calls "agency transfer rules." The Draft 2003 OMB report lists 23 such rules, issued by a diverse group of agencies, including Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, and Transportation. 3 The 2002 OMB Report lists 72 rules over an eighteen month period. 4 Most of these rules implemented a congressional authorization or mandate to spend money. An appropriation statute would provide that a certain amount of money be given to farmers, or dairy producers, or victims of the 9/11 attack, and would direct an 1 Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to Matthew Adler, John Duffy, Beth Garrett, Tom Merrill, Cass Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule for their comments, and to J.T. Bloch for research assistance. The Sarah Scaife Foundation Fund and The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Fund provided financial support. 2 68 Fed. Reg. 5,492 (February 3, 2003) [Draft 2003 OMB Report] . The reports also discuss regulations issued by independent agencies, make proposals for regulatory reform, and discuss related matters. The OMB Report 2002 covers eighteen months. All of the reports can be downloaded from www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regpol-reports_congress.html. 3 Draft 2003 OMB Report, 68 Fed. Reg., at 5,497, tble. 5. 4 2002 OMB Report, at 59, tble. 10. agency, in very general language, to give the money to the intended beneficiaries. Other transfer rules were issued pursuant to entitlement programs such as Medicare or Social Security. Agencies charged with the task of distributing money under these programs issued regulations that specified who would receive money, how much the person would receive, and how one should apply for it.
OMB has not explained why it excludes transfer regulations from the calculation of the aggregate net benefits of federal regulation but the reason is clear. Ordinary regulations are supposed to correct market failures, and a regulation that successfully corrects a market failure generates social value. Cost-benefit analysis distinguishes regulations that generate social value and those that do not, and an aggregate cost-benefit analysis of all federal regulations reveals whether the regulations as a group increase or decrease efficiency. Transfer regulations, unlike ordinary market-correcting regulations, are not designed to generate value in the economic sense. A transfer regulation that pays $100 to farmers also costs taxpayers $100; the costs and benefits wash out, producing a social loss if administrative costs are greater than 0, as they always are. Thus, a conventional cost-benefit analysis of a transfer regulation will always yield a negative outcome. Treating every transfer regulation as a social cost, and subtracting the costs of transfer regulations from the net benefits of ordinary regulations, would not tell us anything about the quality of agency rulemaking; it would tell us that Congress has decided to use agencies to implement transfers, something we already knew. The purpose of the OMB reports is not to tell Congress that agencies implement transfers; it is to tell Congress about the quality of agency rulemaking.
But this does not mean that transfer regulations cannot be evaluated. The difference between an ordinary regulation and a transfer regulation is, on a rough approximation (to be refined below), that the transfer regulation achieves a distributional goal or outcome mandated by Congress. Ordinary cost-benefit analysis cannot be used for evaluating a transfer regulation but cost-benefit principles can be used. The term of art for a cost-benefit analysis that takes distributional goals as fixed and evaluates the means for achieving them is cost-effectiveness analysis, a decision procedure that is used widely by policy analysts outside the government. 5 Cost-effectiveness analysis is the correct decision procedure for evaluating transfer regulations.
Executive Order 12,886 requires agencies to use cost-benefit analysis or costeffectiveness analysis, whichever is appropriate. 6 It is the successor of Executive Order 12,291, which was signed by President Reagan in 1981. 7 These executive orders, and some other related executive orders and statutes, have caused a significant shift in the practices of regulatory agencies, and over the last two decades it has become standard practice for agencies to perform and report cost-benefit analyses for important regulations other than transfer regulations. OMB reviews agencies' cost-benefit analyses and issues guidelines for good practice, as well as drafting the reports to Congress discussed above.
With the prodding of OMB, the agencies' cost-benefit analyses have gradually improved.
These regulatory changes have in turn generated an enormous academic literature on cost-benefit analysis and its influence on regulatory outcomes. 8 There has been no comparable activity with respect to transfer regulations.
Agencies that implement transfer regulations recognize that Executive Order 12, 886 applies, but they rarely provide the cost-effectiveness analysis that the executive order requires. Although agencies do, usually, say something about the costs of a regulation, their comments are rarely illuminating and often incoherent. Some agencies simply state that the regulation complies with the executive order without further elaboration. 9 Some agencies provide only the amount of the disbursement. 10 Some agencies do perform, or claim to perform, a cost-effectiveness analysis, but in fact make claims inconsistent with 5 It is used frequently for evaluating regulations of medical practices; see Part II.A., for an example. 6 "When an agency determines that a regulation is the best available method of achieving the regulatory objective, it shall design its regulations in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective." Exec. Order No. 12,866 §(1)(b) (5) , 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 §(1)(b)(5) (October 4, 1993). 7 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (February 19, 1981) . 8 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (1982); Cass Sunstein, Risk and Reason (2002) . Neither of these books mentions transfer regulations or says much about cost-effectiveness analysis. Nor can one find discussions in the major case books. 9 E.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of Cerro Grande Fire Claims, 66 Fed. Reg. 15,948, 15,958 (March 21, 2001) . 10 cost-effectiveness principles. 11 OMB does not appear to engage in a strict review, as it does for cost-benefit analysis of ordinary, non-transfer regulations; 12 and, as noted above, its annual reports to Congress do not discuss the quality of the cost-effectiveness analyses performed by agencies during the prior year. The academic literature on transfer regulations is nil.
What explains the contrast between the intensity of interest in cost-benefit analysis of regulations designed to solve market failures, and cost-effectiveness analysis of transfer regulations? OMB says nothing about this topic in its reports to Congress: it lists the transfer regulations without explaining why their costs and benefits are not discussed. A separate document, the Best Practices guidelines, implies without saying explicitly that transfer regulations are not susceptible to cost-benefit analysis because cost-benefit analysis is not designed to evaluate transfers. 13 But the obvious rejoinder, that cost-effectiveness analysis can be used to evaluate transfer regulations, is not discussed. In short, there has been virtually no discussion -not by OMB or the agencies, not by academics -about the use of cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer regulations that disburse money or other benefits to specified groups. This paper is a first effort to fill this gap. Part I defines transfer regulations and discusses their purposes and effects. Part II discusses cost-effectiveness analysis and explains how it can be used both to evaluate transfer regulations and to evaluate the statutes that authorize transfer regulations. Part III provides some examples of how agencies evaluate transfer regulations. Agencies sometimes claim to perform costeffectiveness analysis on transfer regulations but rarely perform it correctly. Throughout, it should be understood that there is no presumption that transfer regulations are undesirable; they can be used to good and bad ends, just like any other kind of regulation. 11 Consider, for example, a regulation that implements a congressional appropriation for monetary relief to victims of a natural disaster. This regulation looks like a straightforward transfer of money from the government to individuals, but it might be justified by a failure in the insurance market. If the insurance market fails to provide disaster insurance, the government might be justified in providing that insurance. One way to provide such insurance is to wait for a disaster to occur and then make payments to victims. If, as seems likely, people anticipate these transfers ex ante, then the regulation (in theory) enhances efficiency by enabling people to pool risk.
As for prescriptive regulations that serve distributional purposes, consider regulations that implement a congressional plan to support farm prices through a quota system. The regulations do not transfer money to farmers, but limit the amount of production. But through the limitation on production, prices are increased and farmers are benefited. Although the regulation prescribes behavior, it serves a distributional aim, not efficiency.
To bring order to this confusion, we need to make a number of distinctions, as shown in Table 2 . There are two types of regulations -prescriptive and transfer -and two broad types of statutory goals, to increase efficiency and to make distributions. Within the category of efficiency-oriented statutes, some statutes state that the regulations should achieve relatively abstract benefits -public health, for example -and other statutes specify a concrete benefit such as reduction in the emission of a particular pollutant.
Cost-benefit analysis can be used only to evaluate prescriptive regulations authorized by statutes that do not specify the distribution in detail. A pollution statute that directs an agency to enhance public health gives the agency the discretion to choose among alternative regulations on the basis of their efficiency; 15 a pollution statute that directs an agency to limit pollution to a certain level does not give the agency the option to refrain from regulating when the statutory level is itself inefficient. Thus, cost-benefit analysis cannot be used in the latter case, though cost-effectiveness analysis can be used to distinguish among more or less costly ways to achieve the statutory level of pollution.
Cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer regulations that are issued pursuant to a statute that is designed to enhance efficiency. Consider a statute that funds general scientific research on the theory that the market undersupplies such
research. An agency is directed to issue transfer regulations that provide the rules for applying for grants. The statute might or might not have the effect of enhancing efficiency through regulation, but the agency cannot veto the statute, so there is no point in doing a cost-benefit analysis of the entire statutory scheme. The agency can only do cost-effectiveness analysis, which will reveal whether a given regulation is less costly 15 Unless the statute mandates a minimum level of regulation when any amount of regulation is inefficient. than alternative regulations for accomplishing the statutory goal of converting money into knowledge.
When we turn to statutes that have distributional aims, we see that neither prescriptive regulations nor transfer regulations can be evaluated using cost-benefit analysis. Again, when the statutes specifies a distribution, cost-benefit analysis cannot be used. But cost-effectiveness analysis is appropriate, as we will see.
It is worth mentioning that statutory distributional schemes generally have two distinct purposes. The first purpose is to benefit a politically influential group, such as dairy producers or tobacco farmers. No serious scholar defends these transfers, and their unattractiveness might explain why the academic literature has ignored them. The implicit assumption seems to be that if these transfers are bad, then the regulations that implement them are bad, and there is no reason to discuss how to make them costeffective. This response, however, is wrong. If politically motivated transfers are regrettable, they are a fact of life, and it is an important task to analyze how to implement them in a way that minimizes their disruptive impact on the economy.
The second purpose of transfer regulations is to benefit poor people, people who suffer from discrimination, and people who have suffered a misfortune. Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid authorize transfer regulations that provide benefits to the poor and not-so-poor. Regulations detailing affirmative action programs for government contractors benefit victims of discrimination. And the regulations governing the disbursements of 9/11 moneys and moneys for natural disasters benefit victims of a misfortune. 16 Regulations are needed because Congress does not want to determine every detail about how funds are allocated and disbursed, and transfers these functions to an agency. Limited transfers to poor and unfortunate people are relatively uncontroversial, and it is thus a puzzle that the question of how to evaluate agency regulations that implement these transfers has been neglected by legal scholars.
Distributional statutes, then, are sometimes normatively defensible and sometimes not. But it is important to see that prescriptive regulations and transfer regulations authorized by distributional statutes all fail a standard cost-benefit analysis, that is, one that does not use a multiplier to adjust for the lower purchasing power of the poor. 17 When a regulation disburses cash, the benefits can be no greater than the costs, and will be lower as long as there is some administrative cost. Consider a payment of $100 to a dairy producer. The benefit of the regulation is $100, and the cost of the regulation is $100 plus administrative expenses (and tax distortions if such is the case). This remains true for transfers to the poor. The benefit of a $100 transfer to a poor person is $100, and the cost is $100 plus administrative expenses. It is true that a poor person is likely to value $100 more than a rich person (or dairy producer) is: but such differences are excluded from cost-benefit analysis as it is usually performed. 18 Cost-benefit analysis does not take account of the fact that the poor person values $100 more than the rich person does. Thus, cost-benefit analysis tells us that transfers to interest groups and poor people produce negative net benefits, and do not allow us to distinguish between these types of transfers, and it does not allow us to distinguish between better and worse regulations given a particular distributional goal.
In sum, cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer or prescriptive regulations that have distributional aims, nor to evaluate transfer regulations that implement statutes with efficiency goals that do not leave the benefit or distribution decision to agencies. For all these purposes, cost-effectiveness analysis is necessary. The next Part focuses on the simplest case -the use of cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer regulations authorized by statutes with distributional goals -though most of what is said will apply to the other cases as well.
II. ANALYSIS OF TRANSFER REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

A. Analysis of Regulations
A cost-effective transfer regulation distributes resources less wastefully than alternative transfer regulations do. To take a simple example, consider a statute that authorizes an agency to distribute $10 million to victims of a natural disaster. The agency 17 At one time economists believed that multipliers could be used to reflect variation in the valuation of marginal dollars by people of different wealth, but this project foundered on technical, empirical, and philosophical difficulties. For a brief discussion, see Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance 259-60 (3d ed. 1992). 18 A government medical agency with a fixed budget and the mandate to increase qalys will purchase medical devices with higher qaly/cost ratios until the budget is exhausted. 19 The budgetary outlay and the mandate to maximize qalys are fixed; cost-effectiveness analysis tells the agency which medical devices maximize qalys given the budgetary constraint.
Another example of cost-effectiveness analysis comes from its use to evaluate environmental projects. Suppose that a certain environmental goal -a reduction of air pollution, for example -is provided by statute but the agency is given the discretion to choose among means. The agency can mandate the washing of coal prior to its use in power plants, or the use of scrubbers attached to smokestacks, or some combination; or it can choose to put limits on the amount of pollution generated by factories while allowing factory owner to choose among different technologies; or it can create a system of tradable emission permits; or it can choose some other rule or framework for achieving the ends set by statute. For a given reduction of air pollution, each regulatory instrument will have a different cost. Cost-effectiveness analysis compares the costs of the different means, and identifies the least-cost means as the most cost-effective. 20 A third example of cost-effectiveness analysis is its use to evaluate income redistribution programs. The goal is redistribution of wealth from rich to poor; the constraint is the willingness of taxpayers to pay for the redistribution. The policy analyst must evaluate different mechanisms, none of which is perfect. Tax and transfer systems, for example, require administratively costly determinations of need or else result in the inclusion of wealthy people with low income or the exclusion of poor people with higher incomes (for example, because they have many children or high medical costs).
Minimum wage laws are less complex but exclude nonworkers and may hurt low-income workers. Tax and transfer systems distort labor-leisure choices; minimum wage laws impose deadweight costs on consumers or shareholders. A cost-effectiveness analysis cuts through these apparent incommensurables, and shows that tax and transfer systems are likely to be superior: holding constant the payments to beneficiaries, they result in lower social cost. 21 The basic idea behind cost-effectiveness analysis is that of comparing alternative regulations or projects when either the costs or the benefits are fixed. 22 The right form of cost-effectiveness analysis depends heavily on the statutory goal. Suppose, for example, that Congress appropriates $100 million and authorizes USDA to spend it on lunches for needy schoolchildren. Consider three alternative regulations. (1) Give the money to schools in poor census districts. (2) Give the money to schools in proportion to the number of needy students in each school. (3) Give school lunch vouchers to parents whose family income falls below the poverty line. 23 20 For well known example, see Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air 66-72 (1981). 21 Edward M. Gramlich, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Government Programs 123- 33 (1981) . 22 I follow the simple discussion in Edith Stokey & Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis 152-55 (1978) 23 This example is based loosely on the regulation discussed in Part III.B.
Each alternative has different costs. Under #1, USDA must process applications from schools and monitor their behavior, to ensure that the money is used to buy lunches, but this approach avoids the need to determine the poverty level of individual students.
Under #2, USDA deals with a larger number of schools and engages in more intensive monitoring; but it will also get more lunches to more poor students. Under #3, USDA must print and distribute vouchers, and ensure that they are used properly; but it will also reach children who are not at school, and children at schools that fail to apply for school lunch benefits. The regulations provide, respectively, increasing accuracy at increasing cost.
Cost-effectiveness analysis of alternatives can be illustrated with a few numbers.
If USDA itself paid all of the administrative costs (including those of the schools and parents) from the appropriation, the calculation would be simple. Just choose the regulation that gets the most lunches to needy children. If, as is more likely, USDA's administrative costs come from another appropriation, and schools and parents must absorb their own administrative costs, then a slightly more complex calculation is needed, as illustrated by Table 3 . According to these figures, regulation #2 is the most cost-effective: it sends lunches to needy children at least cost per child.
Congress might alternatively pass a statute that directs USDA to provide lunches for, say, 18 million needy children, to be paid out of a general appropriation. Again, USDA would come up with various alternative regulations, and compare them. It would modify the regulations so that they would achieve the statutory end, and then compare them, as in Table 4 . Now regulation #3 is the most cost-effective.
I have simplified in order to convey the basic principles of cost-effectiveness analysis. A few observations are now necessary. First, note the difference between costbenefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. All of these regulations would fail a standard cost-benefit analysis because a transfer to needy children is not a "benefit" in the conventional economic sense -it's just a transfer. The cost to the taxpayer offsets the benefit to the needy child, and the administrative costs are a deadweight loss. To fulfill the congressional mandate to transfer resources to needy children, USDA could not use cost-benefit analysis.
Second, the cost-effectiveness analysis, as I have performed it, assumes that the value of getting a lunch to a non-needy child is zero. This might be a reasonable assumption, but it also might not be true. Congress could worry that non-needy children do not always have nutritional lunches and want to remedy this situation. Thus, a more accurate cost-effectiveness analysis might attach some weight to a lunch received by a non-needy child -say, 10 percent of the value of a lunch to a needy child -and the agency could use this weighting in the cost-effectiveness analysis; it should also make the weighting explicit, so that elected officials would know the basis of the decision. In some situations, this might produce different results -regulation #1 might be better than #2 or #3 -but it also seems reasonable for the agency to take its lead from Congress, and not attach value to the receipt of lunches by non-needy children unless Congress says otherwise.
Third, one might argue in the first example that the choice of regulation #2 defeats Congress's purpose: Congress wants to get as many lunches to needy children as possible, and for that purpose regulation #3 is better, even if more costly per lunch. But it would be better for USDA to return to Congress and ask for a larger appropriation, so that 19 million needy children would be benefited using regulation #2, explaining that the extra budgetary expense is less than the administrative costs under regulation #3.
Fourth, one should note that Congress could choose different ends -at a higher or lower level of abstraction. Congress could ask USDA to ensure that all children have adequate nutrition, understanding that poorer children need more aid. Congress could give USDA the option to provide school breakfasts as well as lunches, or more food stamps, or cash assistance, or educational programs about good eating habits, and so forth. Congress might also stipulate the nutritional content of the lunches, or leave that decision up to USDA. The more discretion that USDA has, the more complex the costeffectiveness analysis will be. As the level of abstraction increases, cost-effectiveness analysis becomes the same as cost-benefit analysis.
One problem with using cost-effectiveness analysis to evaluate transfer regulations is that if the underlying transfer statute itself is bad, then we are firmly in the world of the second best, and cost-effectiveness analysis might have perverse effects.
Consider a statute that appropriates $100 million for dairy producers because of their political influence and not because of any legitimate need. A highly cost-effective statute will result in more money in the pockets of the dairy producers, and less squandered on administrative expenses, but that just means more slops in the political trough, and more lobbyists sidling up to it. 24 (This problem is not as severe for regulations that survive cost-benefit analysis. 25 ) Cost-effectiveness is not an ultimate moral value; the social value of even a highly cost-effective regulation depends on the social value of the statutory program that it implements. For that reason, it might be desirable for agencies to evaluate the authorizing statute as well as the regulations. This is the topic of the next section.
B. Analysis of the Authorizing Statute
When Congress authorizes a distribution to a particular group, agencies cannot usually prevent the distribution from occurring as intended. 26 But there are actions short 24 Cf. Gary Becker & Casey Mulligan, Accounting for the Growth of Government (unpublished manuscript, 1998). 25 of interference that might improve distributional outcomes and the political process that leads to them. Of special interest are reporting requirements, such as those created by NEPA, which requires agencies to issue environmental impact statements. 27 Rather than banning activity that harms the environment, NEPA requires agencies to estimate and report the environmental impact of projects such as the construction of highways. 28 Opponents of the regulation cannot seek relief from a court unless an agency fails to issue an adequate environmental impact statement. If the environmental impact statement is adequate, opponents must take their case to elected officials and seek a political remedy.
Agencies that issue transfer regulations could similarly be required to report the welfare costs and distributional effects of these regulations -that is, to issue "welfare impact statements." If the welfare impact is objectionable, then critics can bring this information to politicians and lobby for reform. The welfare impact statement would include the following information.
Distribution of benefits. In 1999 Congress passed an appropriations bill that provided relief to dairy producers who had incurred large losses after the collapse of dairy prices. The bill directed USDA to give money to dairy producers, but did not say (a) which dairy producers would receive money, and (b) how much money each would receive. 29 USDA promulgated a transfer regulation that, among other things, distributed moneys to dairy producers on the basis of their production in 1997 and 1998. As I will discuss in Part III.C., USDA used both years in order to avoid the cost of collecting new information from producers who had provided 1997 production figures when enrolled in the program the year before, but as a result some firms, including firms that had stopped production, would receive payments even though they did not lose money in 1998 as a result of the market collapse. . 28 There is no substantive review under NEPA. 29 See Part III.C.
The statement that accompanied the USDA's transfer regulation did not explicitly describe the distributive consequences, though they could have been inferred from the formula in the regulation by someone who had data about the structure of the industry.
The agency had information about the industry, and could have provided more detailed information about the distributional effects of the regulation. It could, for example, have broken down producers by size, and describes the average level of compensation for each group of producers -both in absolute terms and as a percentage of each producer's loss.
The agency could also have provided correlations between compensation level and other attributes such as location, number of employees, and so forth.
The reason for requiring the agency to provide this information is that it facilitates monitoring of the agency by Congress, affected parties, and the public. 30 To the extent that agencies can provide a concise, numerical account of the distribution of benefits, Congress or relevant staffers or committees can relatively easily check that the agency is acting consistently with statutory goals. If the agency is not, Congress can in future exercise greater oversight or enact more precise statutes. 31 Deadweight costs. It is possible that these distributional effects of the dairy market regulation, though not intended by Congress, could have been justified by a costeffectiveness analysis, which would show that a more accurate distribution of benefits would have entailed excessive administrative costs. But even if this is the case, there is the further question whether the basic statutory goal of compensating dairy producers is desirable, given the inevitable welfare losses that accompany any distributional scheme.
One might think that Congress took these costs into account when it enacted the statute, or that the agency has no basis for questioning Congress's decision in any event. But NEPA suggests a different view. Congress both authorizes agencies to approve projects that have harmful environmental impacts and requires agencies to issue a report describing these impacts. The reason is presumably to provide a check on agencies that focus too much on their mission and discount environmental concerns. Similarly, Congress could ask agencies both to redistribute wealth and to report the welfare distortions caused by redistribution. 30 See Sunstein, Risk and Reason, supra note __, at ch. 8, on the effects of informational regulations. 31 Exec. Order 12,866 already requires a discussion of distribution, but agencies usually respond with boilerplate.
In welfare economics, it is often said that a transfer does not have any efficiency effects, but this statement is a simplification that does not take account of so-called indirect costs. Every transfer requires taxation and all taxation (except under never-found circumstances) causes distortions. The $200 million appropriated for dairy producers comes from the pockets of taxpayers, and will distort their choices between labor and leisure as well as other activities. There are standard, albeit rough, ways to measure this welfare loss and the welfare loss could be reported by the agency. 32 Prescriptive regulations that redistribute wealth though market restrictions cause even greater distortions, which can also be calculated and reported. 33 In addition, the behavior of recipients of transfers can also be distorted as long as the transfer is not a surprise. The dairy industry knows that it will receive transfers from Congress when dairy prices collapse; as a result, producers do not allocate resources efficiently. Some should not be in business in the first place; others should diversify or take other steps to protect themselves against downturns. Every transfer reinforces the expectation that Congress will intervene in the future, and thus results in distortions. These distortions can be calculated and reported.
The reason for reporting this information is that Congress and the public might not know the economic cost of the transfers that have been authorized. The report of deadweight costs makes it explicit that the transfer of money to dairy producers and other interest groups has effects beyond the obvious distributional changes. People who are willing to tolerate the distributional changes might change their minds when they learn the accompanying deadweight cost. In many circumstances, there will not be the political will to repeal statutory transfers or resist enacting them in the first place, but greater public awareness of their costs might have a desirable effect on the margin.
Pareto-Superior Regulations.
As a supplement to the information on deadweight costs, an agency could propose a statutory scheme that is Pareto superior to the authorizing statute. 34 Frequently, this will be impractical or pointless, but in many cases the proposal would make clear the problems with the statute. For example, it is often the 32 See Rosen, supra note _, at 305-322. 33 See Gramlich, supra note __, at 123-33. 34 case that giving cash to beneficiaries is Pareto superior to using price controls or quantity limits. Consider a statutory program that benefits farmers by increasing prices and revenues through restrictions on production. If, instead, the quotas were eliminated and farmers were given cash equal to the implicit subsidy created by the quotas, there would be money left over for taxpayers or other beneficiaries.
We might imagine that when an agency proposes a quota regulation pursuant to a statute that provides for quotas, it will also report the Pareto superior statutory scheme.
The report could be sent to Congress, which might then decide to stop the regulation and appropriate money for the proposed transfer. 35 Although Congress might often refuse to enact the Pareto superior appropriation because of inertia, time constraints, or a desire to retain the disguise on the transfer, in some cases it might well prefer the Pareto superior appropriation, and act accordingly.
I have argued that regulatory oversight of transfer regulations would be improved if agencies reported three kinds of information: the distributive effects of the regulation;
its welfare costs; and any Pareto superior alternatives. As Part IV will discuss, Executive
Order 12,866 already authorizes the first type of reporting, and probably the other two as well, but a statute modeled on NEPA might also be desirable. Just as NEPA requires agencies to report the environmental impact of regulations without directly banning environmentally unsound regulations, the proposed statute would require agencies to report the welfare impact of regulations without directly banning distributively unjust regulations. The agency would, in effect, route opponents of the regulation to the political process. 36 The benefits to the political process could be expected to be similar to those that NEPA has produced.
There is, however, an important objection to reporting requirements. NEPA has, in practice, imposed considerable administrative and litigation costs on agencies.
Environmentalists have used NEPA to delay and block regulations: agencies frequently have decided that the administrative and litigation costs, and perhaps the political costs as 35 A legislative veto is illegal, but informal pressure on the agency might be sufficient, or else a statutory injunction against the regulation would be necessary. 36 There are other programs designed to regulate through information disclosure; one prominent example is the toxics release inventory. well, are so high that an otherwise legal regulation is not worth defending. 37 The NEPA experience suggests that reporting requirements for transfer regulations might involve high administrative costs, and be used as a weapon against transfer regulations. Whether this is good or bad depends on how high the costs will be, and what kind of regulations are likely to blocked. It is possible that reporting requirements can, in the American legal and political system, only generate either boilerplate (if the legal standard is low) or excessive litigation (if the legal standard is high), in which case reporting requirements for transfer regulations would be inadvisable. Much depends on whether there are groups that will monitor welfare impact statements, and take agencies to court when they fail to issue adequate welfare impact statements, as environmental groups have done for environmental impact statements. Too much enthusiasm for litigation might lead to interference with normal agency functions; however, too little enthusiasm might again lead to statements containing nothing but boilerplate.
C. Mixed Regulations and Distributional Questions
Many statutes authorize agencies to issue prescriptive regulations that both cure market failures and effect transfers to particular groups. A statute designed to restrict pollution might insist that factories in one region cut emissions more than factories in another region; or that all factories use a technology that is cheaper for some factories than for others. If Congress could have achieved its goals equally well or better without making these distinctions, then the statute self-consciously redistributes wealth compared to a statute whose distributional effects follow naturally from the primary goal of correcting a market failure. The agency must accept statutory constraints, and when it performs cost-benefit analysis it implicitly must exclude alternative regulations that have a higher benefit-cost ratio but that do not have the prescribed distributional effects. 38 More interesting, when agencies have a broad mandate to solve market failures, they will face two possible situations: (1) where there is a single optimal regulation that might or might not have desirable distributional effects; and (2) where there are multiple regulations with equal benefit-cost ratios and different distributional effects.
In the first case, cost-benefit analysis supports one outcome. If the agency promulgates a different regulation with a more attractive distributive effect, that regulation is a mixed regulation. There is reason to think that agencies do this. When agencies justify regulations they often explain how they designed the regulation so that the burden is not concentrated on the poor, or on a particular segment of the population, or on residents of a particular geographical area; or they note that the regulation favors small businesses at the expense of big businesses. For example, in 1982 EPA proposed regulations governing the lead content limits for gasoline that imposed stricter standards on larger refineries than on small refineries. 39 And agencies are directed to do this, in part by executive orders, and perhaps also in part by a political sense of the groups that Congress or oversight committee members care about. 40 In all these cases, the agency's decision procedure is most accurately described not as cost-benefit analysis, but as costeffectiveness analysis of various routes to some distributional goal.
In the second case, cost-benefit analysis does not distinguish among multiple regulations with different distributional effects, and for that reasons the agency must issue a mixed regulation that reflects an implicit or explicit decision about distribution. In the absence of legislative guidance, the agency might rely on any of the factors described in the previous paragraph, or its own beliefs about distributional equities. In this case, the agency's decision procedure is cost-benefit analysis, but supplemented with (not constrained by) a distributive judgment.
A related question -but one that can only be mentioned and not answered hereis why there is no distributional analogy to Executive Order 12,866's mandate to use cost-benefit analysis. In theory, an executive order could require agencies that are given vague statutory direction to promulgate prescriptive or transfer regulations that meet certain distributional criteria. Indeed, it appears that agencies already do this, albeit in a an ad hoc way. 41 The question is why OMB does not demand more consistent and specific distributional results -for example, regulations that improve the Gini coefficient, or some other measure of equality. 42 No doubt the answer has to do with the difficulty of specifying distributional criteria that are as clear as the cost-benefit standard, but this difficulty itself is something of a mystery. 43 
D. The Opportunities and Limits of OMB Review
The OMB has been the chief force behind the spread of cost-benefit principles among agencies, and it could serve a similar role for cost-effectiveness analysis. How cost-effectiveness analysis of transfer regulations might improve the political process depends on the goals and incentives of the relevant political actors. We can distinguish two broad possibilities -both are caricatures intended only to make clear the forces at work.
Congress is honest but agencies are not. Suppose that Congress honestly
legislates in the public interest, but that agencies have specific goals or missions that deviate from congressional goals. Congress has diverse methods for disciplining agencies, but with agenda setting power and superior information about their regulatory domain agencies can issue regulations that differ from Congress' ideal. However, if agencies were required to perform cost-effectiveness analyses on transfer regulations, and faced sanctions if they did not, they would be, in effect, forced to divulge some of their private information, which would facilitate monitoring by Congress or the relevant committees. Here, cost-effectiveness analysis, like cost-benefit analysis of prescriptive market-correcting regulations, is a device for solving a principal-agent problem. 44 Congress is dishonest but the president is not. Suppose that Congress seeks to pay off interest groups, while the President, with his broad national mandate, prefers to regulate in the public interest. Transfer statutes, then, do not distribute wealth to deserving beneficiaries, but to interest groups. However, because Congress enacts vague 41 See the farm relief regulation discussed in Part III.A.; the agency imposed a cap on the size of the transfer without any statutory authority, thus favoring smaller producers relative to larger producers (though not necessarily wealthier producers relative to poorer producers). 42 For a discussion of measures of equality, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector 230- 35 (1986) . 43 See Larry Temkin, Inequality (1996). 44 Cf. Posner, supra note __.
statutes that delegate a great deal of discretion to agencies, the president can use his authority over the agencies to counter Congress's efforts. Vague statutes that appear public spirited but are designed to benefit interest groups become less effective at inspiring regulations that pay off interest groups. Consider a tax credit law that has the overt aim of creating jobs but is in fact intended to, or partly intended to, benefit firms that fill out the forms for companies that claim the tax credit. 45 If the statute is vague enough, and does not explicitly require contracting with members of the interest group, then a regulation that does involve that group is likely to fail a cost-effectiveness analysis. Thus, the president, through OMB, can use the cost-effectiveness obligation to resist congressional efforts to disguise transfers, forcing Congress either to make the transfers explicit -which entails political costs -or to abandon them.
E. Judicial Review
Judicial deference to agency action is justified by division of labor: agencies are specialists, judges are generalists. The problem with judicial deference is that agencies can use their discretion in ways that are inconsistent with social welfare and congressional policy, as the case may be. Agencies might transfer resources to politically powerful interest groups or indulge ideological passions not shared by the public. The virtue of cost-benefit analysis (as a statutory mandate) is that it harnesses the power of quantification, permitting courts to scrutinize an agency's decision without reproducing it. When monetization of costs and benefits does not otherwise distort the agency's mission too much, judicial enforcement of cost-benefit analysis will produce better regulations, regulations that do not reflect the internal biases of the agency or its chief. 46 As we have seen, cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to evaluate transfer regulations. If judges enforced cost-benefit analysis, all transfer regulations would be struck down. However, with legislative authorization -or through aggressive interpretation of the arbitrary and capricious standard 47 -courts could use costeffectiveness analysis to review transfer regulations. This could take many forms. At the lowest levels, courts would remand regulations when the accompanying statement in the Federal Register does not include cost-effectiveness ratios for the regulation itself and for a range of plausible alternative regulations. In addition, a transfer regulation that is less cost-effective than an alternative that is within the agency's authority would be vacated on judicial review, and on remand the agency would be required to issue the costeffective transfer regulation. There would still be role for judicial deference, as in the case for cost-benefit analysis. Determining the distributional goals of a statute would need to be discretionary within a broad range. But this would not mean that the agency is unconstrained. At a minimum, agencies would be required to act consistently across regulations. In a similar way, although agencies have some discretion to choose discount factors and valuations of life for cost-benefit analysis, a consistency requirement across regulations and agencies constrains their behavior in useful ways. 48 My suggestion is not radical. Courts already review agencies' cost-effectiveness analyses when transfer regulations are the subject of litigation. Part III will discuss some examples. 49 But, as we will see, the judicial efforts are dispiriting. Although courts focus on the right issues -whether inaccurate distributions should be tolerated in order to reduce administrative costs -courts rarely demand that agencies provide data that support their cost-effectiveness analyses, and so it is always hard to see why courts approve some transfer regulations while rejecting others. One senses that courts rely on a rough sense of the ideal distributional outcome intended by the statute and are impatient with arguments that administrative cost savings justify reliance on crude proxies or bright line rules that result in distributions that deviate from the ideal. If courts think it proper to defer to agency judgments, then they should not reject these arguments; if they think it proper to scrutinize the agency's claims, they should demand data and based their own judgment on an assessment of the facts. Currently, they do neither. 48 Posner, supra note __. 49 these questions is probably that agencies' cost-benefit analyses supply much more data than agencies' cost-effectiveness analyses, making scholarly review of the cost-benefit analyses easier.
In the absence of data about cost-effectiveness, the best way to determine whether agencies issue cost-effective transfer regulations would be through an empirical study that lined up all the regulations and determined whether their cost-effectiveness ratios were superior to plausible alternatives. Such a study, however, would be nearly impossible. One cannot know whether a regulation that provides school lunches at For these reasons, I will take the less ambitious route and evaluate the quality of the cost-effectiveness analysis in a small sample of regulations. The point here is not to defend or criticize the regulations themselves, but to evaluate the reasoning of the agency.
A. Farm Relief
In 1998 farm prices collapsed and Congress responded by appropriating funds for the relief of farmers and dairy producers who were harmed by the decline in prices. In Payments would be based on production in 1997 and 1998. As a result, producers who had gone out of business in 1999 or even 1998 would nonetheless obtain compensation as though they had been in business but had lost money. Milk Train, a consortium of large milk producers, brought suit against the Secretary, arguing that the cap and the automatic enrollment provisions favored smaller dairy producers. The cap clearly prevented larger producers from obtaining compensation for their losses beyond the cap; and the automatic enrollment provisions extended this preferential treatment to producers (presumably, smaller producers) who were no longer in the dairy business.
The Secretary argued that the rule complied with Executive Order 12,866 (the most recent cost-benefit executive order) and passed a cost-benefit test, 55 a claim that was apparently accepted by the D.C. Circuit Court. 56 Although the agency's description of the cost-benefit analysis is hard to follow, the Secretary seemed to believe that a payment of $173 million to dairy producers could create benefits of $400 to $600 million. "The differences between outlays, which are virtually all direct transfers to program participants, and income, are made up of increased dairy prices...." 57 This explanation does not make any sense. Cash transfers to dairy producers would not normally increase dairy prices, but even if they did, the loss to consumers -not mentioned anywherewould offset the gain in income. Secretary argued that deviations from the statutory goal were justified by administrative cost savings.
It is possible that the automatic enrollment portion of the rule was more costeffective than an alternative procedure, such as a requirement that dairy producers fill out new applications and provide supporting evidence. The automatic enrollment provision was intended to avoid the cost of applying for compensation and the cost of processing applications, the first borne by the producers and the second borne by USDA. The provision also would result in the transfer of moneys to producers who had gone out of business, leaving less in the treasury for the intended beneficiaries of the statute. The question, then, is whether the administrative cost savings justified these error costs.
Answering this question requires some numbers. USDA could have estimated the application and processing costs by extrapolating from its past experiences with administering transfer programs, and USDA could have estimated the error costs from industry data on liquidations of producers. It seems likely that these estimates would have been relatively easy to make, and not involve vast administrative expenses. But because USDA did not make these estimates, and provide the relevant data, it is impossible to know whether the automatic enrollment provision was cost-effective.
It is less likely that the cap was cost-effective. 58 It is hard to see how it could have saved administrative costs, while it clearly deprived large producers of their entitlements under the statute.
B. School Breakfasts and Lunches
The School Breakfast Program, National School Lunch Act and Child Nutrition Act established the School Breakfast Program, which provided funds for eligible schools that offer free breakfasts to their students. 59 School districts and state educational agencies apply for funds from the USDA, which issues regulations describing the criteria for eligibility. The statute provides that one goal of the program, although not the only goal, is to ensure that funds for breakfasts "to the maximum extent practicable ... reach 58 The court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Secretary's decision to impose the cap, which, in the court's view, was discretionary under 701(a)(2) of the APA. 59 needy children." 60 The plaintiffs, a class of needy children, argued that USDA violated the statute by failing to demand from school districts enough information to determine that needy children were being helped, and for refusing to withhold funds from schools in districts that failed to provide such information. 61
The challenged regulations required that applicants provide information about how they planned to distribute funds, and how many schools with needy students would not be served, but the requirements were minimal. The states themselves defined "needy"
in an inconsistent way, and many states did not reveal how they defined need, so that a school with a fair number of needy students might be defined as a non-needy school.
Further, USDA did not have in place any process for verifying that the states provided accurate information; did not try to encourage states to bring more needy children within the program; and did not encourage compliance by threatening uncooperative school districts with sanctions at its disposal, such as a cutoff of federal aid. 62 The court did not quarrel with all of these practices, but it ordered USDA to issue regulations that required schools to provide more information about the effect of their plans on needy children.
The case reflects the tradeoff between decision and error costs. USDA emphasized decision costs. It did not demand much information from states and did not verify that information, because doing so would have been too costly -both for the schools and for USDA. As a result, many schools would obtain funds even though they did not serve needy children, and many schools that served needy children would not obtain funds. The court's holding implicitly assumed that more stringent information requirements would not burden the schools or USDA too much, but would reduce the amount of error. But the court was not willing to demand a great deal of extra work from USDA, and presumably the reason was that excessive decision costs would interfere with the operation of the program, burden schools, or have a similar perverse effect on the distribution of funds. 60 But the court did not explain why it thought that demanding more information from states was cost-justified but that verifying the accuracy of this information was not cost-justified. These claims are susceptible to empirical analysis. For the states, determining the numbers and locations of needy students in the school system is expensive: surveys must be conducted, answers must be verified, and data must be failed to provide the necessary information, it is impossible to evaluate USDA's actual regulation on cost-effectiveness grounds.
C. Food Stamps
The Food Stamp Program, like the School Breakfast Program, gives the Secretary of USDA a great deal of discretion to issue regulations, in this case "as he deems necessary or appropriate for the efficient administration" of the program. 64 USDA issued regulations that, among other things, provided that food stamps would be sent by mail, and that the federal government would replace food stamps that were lost in the mail.
Subsequently, Congress enacted a statute that authorized USDA to share the costs with the states, and USDA issued a new regulation that required states to pay for lost food stamps above a threshold -0.5 percent of the value of the coupons sent through the mails. 65 The purpose of the regulation was to give states the "incentive to reduce mail losses" 66 -presumably by cracking down on food stamp thieves. The state of New Mexico brought suit challenging the cost-sharing regulation. 67 New Mexico argued that the regulation assumed that lost coupons were inevitably redeemed -that is, they were not really lost but stolen and used by the thieves or customers of the thieves -when many coupons really were just lost. If the coupons were really lost, then USDA did not lose any money, aside from the trivial printing costs, when it replaced the coupons, and thus should not have been entitled to reimbursement from the state. USDA argued, and the court agreed, that "it would have been irrational for the Department of Agriculture to adopt a tracking system for food stamp issuances and redemptions as the State of New Mexico suggests. Such a system likely would cost more than the savings expected from the mail loss reduction program; thus it was not arbitrary and capricious to reject this proposal." 68 The court agreed that decision costs associated with the tracking regulation would have outweighed the error costs, and therefore that the agency's decision was not illegal.
As far as the opinion indicates, however, the court took the agency's word for it that the tracking system would have cost more than it saved. But this claim was an empirical claim, susceptible to cost-effectiveness analysis. The cost of a tracking system included staff time and other expenses; the benefit of a tracking system was, in this case, the cost savings for the state, but, more broadly, the reduction of resources that would go to criminals rather than to the intended beneficiaries of the food stamp program. The cost-effectiveness inquiry is whether the tracking system would cost less in dollar terms than the extra appropriations needed to replace coupons that would not have been lost if a tracking system had been in effect. An adequate cost-effectiveness analysis would contain estimates of these costs. It would also have considered alternative regulations.
There is a further interesting federalism dimension to the regulation. for self-management training than by paying for medical care for symptoms that could have been avoided through self-management. (Alternatively, cost-effectiveness analysis might have revealed that giving more intensive training to fewer people, or less intensive training to more people, would have produced a greater ratio of benefits to costs.) As is always the case, the cost-effectiveness analysis would not show that Medicare coverage is welfare maximizing; it shows that given the goals of Medicare coverage, one kind of transfer is superior to another.
To sum up, HHS recognized that Executive Order 12,886 applied to the diabetes self-management regulation, and performed a regulatory impact analysis. But its regulatory impact analysis was inadequate. It identified the budgetary costs of the regulation, but did not reduce them to a present value. More important, it failed to monetize the health benefits of the regulation, and to provide an estimate of the probability that self-management would produce these health benefits, and it failed to compare the cost-benefit ratio of the regulation in question with the cost-benefit ratios of alternative regulations. As a result, one cannot determine from the regulatory impact analysis whether the regulation is cost-effective.
IV. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TRANSFER REGULATIONS
Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to perform cost-effectiveness analysis on transfer regulations. Several clauses of this order are pertinent:
When an agency determines that a regulation is the best available method of achieving the regulatory objective, it shall design its regulations in the most cost-effective manner to achieve the regulatory objective. In doing so, each agency shall consider incentives for innovation, consistency, predictability, the costs of enforcement and compliance (to the government, regulated entities, and the public), flexibility, distributive impacts, and equity. 73
This provision appears to apply to transfer regulations. Other provisions of the executive order command agencies to conduct cost-benefit analysis; this provision seems to acknowledge that a cost-benefit analysis might not be consistent with the "regulatory 73 Exec. Order 12,866 §(1)(b)(5); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (October 4, 1993).
objective." If the regulatory objective is not efficiency, it must be redistribution. 74 Because the regulatory objective is set by statute, the president cannot override it through an executive order. But the president can, given standard views of presidential power, guide the means that agencies use to obtain the objective, and this surely includes requiring agencies to use less rather than more expensive methods for achieving the objective. The agency must choose the most "cost-effective manner" for achieving this distribution, one that takes account of "the costs of enforcement and compliance" -what we have called decisions costs -and distributive impacts -what we have called error
costs.
An additional provision requires agencies to provide information about these costs and benefits. The provision says that the agency should provide:
An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of costs and benefits of potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives to the planned regulation, identified by the agencies or the public (including improving the current regulation and reasonably viable nonregulatory actions), and an explanation why the planned regulatory action is preferable to the identified potential alternatives. 75 This is a reporting requirement, and could be used to force agencies to reveal the results of a cost-effectiveness analysis.
Agencies have not (with a few exceptions) accepted these invitations to perform cost-effectiveness analysis on transfer regulations, but OMB could prod them to, as OMB has prodded agencies to perform cost-benefit analysis on regulations designed to solve market failures. Following the cost-benefit model, OMB could announce that agencies should conduct cost-effectiveness analysis of transfer regulations and that OMB will send back to agencies any transfer regulations that are not accompanied by a satisfactory assessment of their cost-effectiveness.
Executive Order 12,866 does not direct agencies to report the economic distortions caused by the transfer statute, as implemented in regulations, or to report 74 Or some other non-efficiency moral goal such as changing preferences, but this is not the case in the transfer regulations that I have examined. 75 Exec. Order 12,866 §(6)(a)(3)(C)(iii); see also 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (October 4, 1993).
Pareto superior distributions that are outside the authority of the agency. 76 To achieve this end, either the president would need to amend the executive order, OMB would need to issue new guidelines, or Congress would need to enact a statute modeled on NEPA. The new language might say:
All major transfer regulations must be accompanied by a report of (1) alternative rules or transfers of money, if any, that would obtain the same distributive goals at a lower cost; and (2) a calculation of the economic distortions caused by the transfer regulations.
For example, a major regulation that implements price supports would identify potential tax-and-transfer regimes for obtaining the same distributional goals at lower cost; and would calculate the economic cost of the price supports.
CONCLUSION
Executive Order 12,886 already requires regulatory agencies to perform costbenefit or cost-effectiveness analysis for major regulations, and agencies have correctly concluded that transfer regulations are not exempt. But they have rarely performed costeffectiveness analysis, and their occasional efforts have been inadequate.
Given the current low level, agencies could improve regulatory performance dramatically by following some simple precepts. Agencies should always report several alternative regulations, not just the regulation that they propose. These alternatives could be generated by staff or by outsiders, including regulated entities. Agencies should describe the distributional effects and administrative costs of each regulation, and provide cost-effectiveness ratios under alternative assumptions. Agencies should discount costs and benefits as they do when performing cost-benefit analysis. And agencies should calculate and report the welfare costs of their regulations.
Courts frequently review cost-effectiveness analyses performed by agencies when litigants challenge transfer regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act, but their judgments do not inspire confidence. Judicial review would be more valuable if courts demanded that agencies supply the data used in the cost-effectiveness analyses, and had a 76 One could possibly find some authority in Exec. Order 12,866 § §(1)(a) and (1)(b)(5). more adequate understanding of cost-effectiveness principles. Although many courts understand that administrative cost savings justify reliance on transfer regulations that are rough rather than specific, they need to understand that one cannot evaluate transfer regulations properly without information about the cost savings and the expected distribution of benefits.
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